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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OP SEPARATIONISTS, INC. 
a Maryland non-profit 




JAY B. TAGGART, Utah State 
Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, 
Defendant/Appellee 
Case No, 91-0387 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HON. TIMOTHY R. HANSON, JUDGE PRESIDING 
(Trial Court Case No. CV-91-090-2848) 
THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, 
INC., CHRIS ALLEN and RICHARD ANDREWS, by and through their 
counsel of record, Brian M. Barnard and John Pace of the 
Utah Legal Clinic, submit the following Brief in support of 
Plaintiffs' appeal. 
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STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION 
Appellants (the "Society") bring this appeal from a 
decision by the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy 
Hanson, judge presiding. The Third Judicial District Court 
granted appellee Jay Taggart's (the "Superintendent") motion 
to dismiss. Appellants seek reversal of that decision and 
consideration on the merits. 
This Court has jurisdiction in this appeal pursuant to 
the provisions of Rule 4A of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Issues 
1. Do plaintiffs; as taxpayers and parents of children 
in the Utah public school system, have standing to challenge 
the Superintendent's gift of ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00) of public funds to the Providence, Rhode Island 
School District so that the School District could pursue its 
legal battle to gain judicial approval of prayer at public 
school graduation ceremonies? 
2 
2. Do the significance of the constitutional issue 
raised by the Superintendent's mis-appropriation, the 
importance of establishing the propriety of the conduct of 
public officials, and the need to provide future 
constitutional guidance to Utah state officials establish 
that judicial review of the Superintendent's mis-use of tax 
funds is proper? 
3. Is the Society entitled to declaratory relief as to 
the unconstitutionality of the Superintendent's gift of ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00) to the Providence, Rhode 
Island School District to aid its legal battle to gain 
judicial approval of prayer at public school graduation 
ceremonies? 
II. Standard of Review 
Because the trial court's rulings on all these issues 
were strictly legal conclusions, this court need accord them 
no deference and should apply a "correction of error" 
standard of review. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 
(Utah 1988). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions are 
determinative in this action: 
Article I, § 4, Utah Constitution: 
• The right of conscience shall never be 
infringed. . . . There shall be no union of 
Church and State, nor shall any church dominate 
the State or interfere with its functions. No 
public money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or for the support of any 
ecclesiastical establishment. 
First Amendment, U.S. Constitution: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This action arises under Article I, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution which prohibits the appropriation of public 
funds in the aid of religious exercise or ecclesiastical 
establishment. Accordingly, the Society challenges the 
Superintendents gift of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) 
of public funds to assist the Providence school district in 
its legal crusade to gain court approval of government 
sponsored prayers at junior high school graduation 
4 
ceremonies. The Society seeks declaratory relief to 
establish the illegality of this appropriation. 
Relevant to this case is the practice of the Utah 
Courts to grant taxpayers standing against state official to 
contest the illegal use of public funds. The Society's 
claim triggers a related policy which permits the courts to 
decide important constitutional issues which are technically 
moot. In certain circumstances, the courts recognize that 
the strong public interest in judicial resolution of cases 
involving the conduct of public officials overrides the 
traditional requirement of case and controversy. 
II. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This is an appeal from a decision by the Honorable 
Timothy Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County dismissing plaintiffs7 complaint, 
(Exhibit "a11 attached; Trial Record at 2-8) , as set forth in 
the court's Minute Entry of July 17, 1991, (Exhibit "b"; 
Trial Record at 33), and later embodied in an Order of 
Dismissal signed August 6, 1991. Exhibit "cM attached; 
Trial Record at 37-38. The notice of appeal was dated 
August 16, 1991 and was timely filed. Exhibit "d" attached; 
Trial Record at 41-42. 
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Judge Hanson dismissed this action, contending that 
plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action. Despite 
the importance of the constitutional questions posed by this 
case, the district court declined to rule on the legality of 
the contested behavior. Appellants seek a ruling on the 
Superintendent's gift to the Providence school district. A 
decision by this Court is particularly appropriate because 
the case involves interpretation of Utah's stringent 
Constitutional church state separation provision and because 
it concerns public officials' duty bound to abide by that 
constitution. 
III. Statement of Facts 
The Utah Chapter of the Society of Separationists, 
Inc., comprised of citizens and taxpayers of Utah including 
appellants Chris Allen and Richard Andrews, has as a 
corporate goal, the preservation of the separation of church 
and state as required by state and federal constitutional 
law. Complaint, 5 1. Several members of the Society are 
parents of children in Utah schools. 
On January 23, 1991, the Superintendent gave the 
Providence School Committee ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00) of Utah state educational funds to aid and 
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encourage the Providence School Committee to pursue a writ 
of certiorari of Lee v. Weisman, U.S. , Case No. 90-
1014, (June 24, 1992). Complaint, 5 7; Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary Disposition 
("Superintendent's Summary Disposition Memo") at 2-3. The 
decision to contribute funds to the Rhode Island legal 
campaign was made after the Superintendent consulted with 
some parties to a pending Utah case challenging public 
prayers at high school graduations, that is, the Attorney 
General, the Governor and leaders of the Utah Legislature. 
Superintendent's Summary Deposition Memo at 2-3. At the 
Superintendent's instructions, Rhode Island was to use these 
funds to seek a reversal of the federal First Circuit Court 
of Appeals' ruling that public prayer at Providence junior 
high school graduation ceremonies violated the federal 
establishment clause. Id.; Weisman v. Lee, 728 F.Supp 68 
(D.R.I. 1990), affirmed 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990). 
Although the gift from Utah was made while the Rhode Island 
School Committee was seeking certiorari review, receiving 
those funds clearly freed other Rhode Island school funds 
which may have paid for the later brief on the merits in 
support of school graduation prayer. 
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At the same time, other Utah public officials were 
becoming involved in the Rhode Island school prayer case. 
At the Superintendent's request, Utah's Attorney General 
prepared and filed an amicus brief also to support Rhode 
Island's bid for certiorari. Superintendent's Summary 
Disposition Memo at 3. After the United States Supreme 
Court agreed to hear the Rhode Island school prayer case, 
the Alpine School District in Utah County filed an amicus 
brief in Lee v. Weisman on the merits, vigorously advocating 
prayer in public schools. Society of Separationists, Inc. 
et al vs. The Board of Education of Alpine School District, 
pending in Fourth District Court in and for Utah County, 
Case No. 91-040-0647. Both the Utah Attorney General and 
the Superintendent publicly announced that they, too, would 
file an amicus brief on the merits in the Rhode Island 
prayer case. Complaint 5 9. 
In light of these extensive expenditures of Utah tax 
funds to advance a pro-prayer stance before the United 
States Supreme Court, the Society pursued its claim for 
declaratory relief herein, seeking judicial consideration of 
issues raised by the Superintendent's conduct. Complaint, 5 
19. Appropriately, plaintiffs no longer seek injunctive 
relief to prevent further appropriations to aid in the Rhode 
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Island case. On June 24, 1992, the Supreme Court decided 
Lee v. Weisman, reconfirming the viability of the Lemon 
test, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) and holding 
unconstitutional the practice of offering public prayers at 
Rhode Island primary and secondary school graduation 
ceremonies. Lee v. Weisman, U.S. , No. 90-1014, U.S. 
Supreme Court, (June 24, 1992). Injunctive relief as 
against Jay B. Taggart personally is also unnecessary since 
he is no longer the Utah State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
The reluctance of the Utah Courts to deny a plaintiff 
access and an opportunity for a judicial resolution of 
claims should compel this Court to allow the Society a 
hearing on the merits of their case. As taxpayers, citizens 
and parents of children in Utah public schools, plaintiffs 
and members of the Society have a right to challenge the 
Superintendent's unlawful expenditure of public funds. 
Indeed, Utah Courts have long granted taxpayers standing to 
seek judicial declaration concerning the unlawful 
expenditure of tax monies. 
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The Society's claim raises important issues of 
constitutional interpretation and the propriety of the 
conduct of public officials, and deserves judicial attention 
despite any claim of being technically moot. The extensive 
financial involvement of Utah state officials in the Rhode 
Island school prayer case, the unwillingness of these 
officials to admit the inappropriateness of their actions, 
and the likelihood that the challenged behavior will be 
repeated underscore the need for judicial resolution and 
instruction in this case. 
Finally, the Superintendent's unlawful financing of the 
Rhode Island appeal should be declared unconstitutional 
under Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. With 
absolute and detailed language, the Utah establishment 
clause specifically prohibits public funds or property from 
being appropriated for religious exercise or ecclesiastical 
establishment. By spending Utah education funds in aid of 
Rhode Island's pro-prayer stance before the United States 
Supreme Court, the Superintendent appropriated public funds 
for the support of religious exercise and establishment. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Society has a Right to Seek Declaratory Relief as to 
the Superintendent's Unconstitutional Expenditure of Public 
Funds to Aid the Rhode Island Pro-Prayer Appeal. 
This Court encourages access to and use of the 
judicial system for the resolution of controversies. 
Warning that dismissal of an action without a hearing on the 
merits is a severe measure to be seldom used, the Court 
insisted that "[w]hen a motion to dismiss is made, the trial 
court should adhere to a policy of being reluctant to turn a 
party out of court without a trial.11 Wells v. Walker Bank 
and Trust Co., Inc., 590 P.2d 1261, 1263 (Utah 1979). 
Because the present case raises significant constitutional 
issues which need resolution, plaintiffs should have their 
day in court. 
Resolution of the controversy at bar is vital to the 
interests of plaintiffs and the public. In light of the 
Utah's particularly stringent constitutional provisions 
establishing the separation of church and state, the 
defendant's conduct warrants review. Unless the Society is 
granted a hearing, parameters concerning the encouragement 
of religious exercise by public officials sworn to uphold 
the Utah Constitution will remain undelineated. 
11 
A. Plaintiffs Have Standing and Have Stated A Claim Upon 
which Relief Can Be Granted, Sufficient to Initiate this 
Action. 
Utah law holds that the Society has standing to contest 
the Superintendent's ten thousand dollar ($10,000.00) 
contribution toward defense of Rhode Island's pro-prayer 
stance. Twice, in situations almost identical to the case 
at bar, this Court has allowed taxpayers to challenge 
unlawful expenditures of public funds. 
1. Utah case law indicates that taxpayers have standing to 
challenge unconstitutional appropriations of public funds. 
Not constrained by the same constitutional case or 
controversy requirements applied to federal courts, Utah 
Courts have substantial discretion to confer standing "where 
matters of great public interest and societal impact are 
concerned." Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 
1978). While the principle of separation of powers demands 
that the courts relinquish some issues to other branches of 
state government, "it is the inherent role of the judiciary 
to interpret constitutional provisions." Jenkins v. Swan, 
675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983) (citing Matheson v. Ferry. 641 
P.2d 674 (1982); Marburv v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)). 
In Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 
454 (Utah 1985), this Court recited the test to determine 
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standing (citing Jenkins v, Swan 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983)) 
(granting Salt Lake County standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of a state tax statute). The Court first 
applies the traditional standing criteria which requires 
that plaintiff be able to "show that he [or she] has 
suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him 
[or her] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal 
dispute.11 Kennecott v. Salt Lake County, 702 P. 2d at 454 
(citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1148). Even if 
traditional standing criteria does not apply, the plaintiff 
has standing if "no one has a greater interest than he [or 
she] and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at all it the 
plaintiff is denied standing." Id. Finally, standing may 
be granted "if the issues raised by the plaintiff are of 
sufficient importance in and of themselves to grant him [or 
her] standing." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150. 
Utilizing this analysis, this Court found taxpayers and 
property owners had standing to sue the Salt Lake City 
School District for declaratory relief: "In the past, this 
Court had granted taxpayers standing to challenge the 
actions of political subdivisions for illegal expenditures 
and to challenge the illegal use of public funds." Olson v. 
Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 962 n.l (Utah 
13 
1986) (citing Brummitt v. Qgden Waterworks Co,. 93 P. 828, 
831 (Utah 1908); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1152-53 (other 
citations omitted)). Following ample precedent for 
taxpayers standing, the Olson plaintiffs had standing 
because "there [were] no more likely appellants and the 
issue [was] otherwise unlikely to be raised*" Olson, 724 P. 
2d at 963 n.l. Accordingly, individual taxpayers and the 
Utah Taxpayers Association1 were allowed to challenge the 
school district's creation of a second item reserve fund and 
the use of the fund to cover unexpected contingencies. Id. 
Similarly, this Court allowed an individual taxpayer to 
challenge the provision of public property and service to 
religious organizations under Article I, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution.2 Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at 1153. 
1
 The Olson Court readily granted the Utah Taxpayers 
Association associational standing to sue on behalf of its 
members under the test articulated in Utah Restaurant 
Association v. Davis County, 709 P.2d 1159, 1162-63 (Utah 
1985). Olson, 724 P.2d at 962-63 n.l. 
2
 While Jenkins was denied standing to contest service 
of Utah educators in the Utah Legislature, this ruling was 
made specifically because he was not a resident of the 
school districts which allowed the challenged practice: 
"Jenkins' interest is less direct than the interest of those 
living in the relevant school districts or legislative 
districts." Jenkins v. Swan, supra 675 P.2d at 1151. 
Unlike Jenkins, the Society has unsurpassed interest in the 
constitutional behavior of state education officials and 
their expenditure of public educational funds. 
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The Court concluded that plaintiff Jenkins was able to bring 
his action under the first step of the standing analysis 
because he alleged direct and adverse injury for the 
government's unlawful expenditures• The Court further 
maintained: 
[W]e need not determine the extent of the adverse 
impact on Jenkins; we only conclude that he has 
alleged a direct adverse impact which may be 
subject to proof, and it is likely that if the 
governmental action is declared unconstitutional, 
the adverse impact on Jenkins will be relieved. 
Id. at 1153. Again, this Court held that taxpayers have 
standing to raise constitutional claims concerning the 
illegal expenditure of public funds. 
2. Plaintiffs and members of the Society qualify under each 
of the three steps of the standing analysis adopted by this 
Court. 
The Society has standing as taxpayers to challenge the 
Superintendent's unconstitutional appropriation of public 
funds. Plaintiffs and members of the Society are 
appropriate parties to bring this action under each step of 
the standing analysis. Like Jenkins, the Society is 
directly and adversely impacted by the Superintendent's 
unlawful expenditures. As parents of students in the public 
schools and as tax paying citizens concerned with the 
education of Utah's youth, plaintiffs have a stake in 
15 
preventing the expenditure of tax money in a manner that 
violates "specific constitutional protections against . . . 
abuses of legislative power," Flast v. Cohen. 392 U.S. 83, 
106 (1968) (taxpayers had standing to seek declaratory 
relief where they alleged that federal officials were using 
public funds to finance instruction in and to purchase 
educational materials for religious and sectarian schools).3 
As taxpayers, plaintiffs will be required to "replenish the 
public treasury for the deficiency . . . caused by the 
misappropriation." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1153 
(quoting Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 434 at 443, 228 P.2d 818 
at 823 (1951). In addition, when the Superintendent's 
actions are declared unconstitutional, the adverse impact 
upon the Society will be alleviated, Jenkins v. Swan, 675 
P.2d at 1153, demonstrating that there is a "causal 
relationship alleged between the injury to the plaintiff[s], 
the governmental actions and the relief requested." Id. at 
1150. 
3 Despite the more stringent standing requirements 
applied in federal court and the reluctance of federal 
courts to grant standing to taxpayers, the Supreme Court 
allowed (and asserted jurisdiction over) this taxpayer suit 
to contest violations of the Establishment Clause by 
education officials. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
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In addition to the Society having standing under the 
first step, the Society has standing because no other party 
has a greater interest in the school board's allocation of 
public funds than the taxpayers and parents who are assessed 
those funds. Kennecott v. Salt Lake County, supra, 702 P.2d 
at 454. These individuals have a profound interest in 
seeing that school board funds are spent for appropriate 
educational purposes and that their children are not denied 
the benefits because of improper allocation of funds. 
Additionally, if plaintiffs were denied standing, the issues 
raised in this case will likely go unresolved. If taxpayers 
and parents are not allowed to contest the spending 
practices of the school board, these education officials 
will "be effectively insulated from challenges." Kennecott 
v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d at 455. 
Finally, the concerns raised by this case are of 
sufficient public importance — in and of themselves — to 
grant the Society standing to pursue its claims. In dispute 
is the unconstitutionality of the conduct of a public 
official sworn to uphold Utah's constitution. Central to 
this case is interpretation of Utah's strict establishment 
clause which prohibits absolutely the expenditure of public 
funds to advance religious exercise. The public is entitled 
17 
to have the Superintendent's actions judicially reviewed 
given the profound interest in seeing that their officials 
follow the state constitution. 
On the basis of the standing requirements adopted by 
this Court and the cases in which the Court has allowed 
taxpayer suits, the Society has standing to bring this 
action. Importantly, plaintiffs and citizens of Utah alike 
have been denied their right not to have tax dollars spent 
in endorsement of religious practices and access to the 
Courts is the most appropriate avenue for relief for this 
injury. 
a. This Case Is Not Moot and Requires Judicial Review and 
Intervention. 
Although there is a judicial policy against the 
adjudication of moot questions, circumstances may afford 
exceptions to this prohibition. See Merhish v. H.A. Folsom 
& Associates, 646 P.2d 731 (Utah 1982).4 This Court has 
4
 In Merhish, this Court ruled that when the only 
specific relief sought - a wage payment - was awarded in 
full, the respondent's motion concerning a lien and a 
garnishment was moot. The Court insisted that the employee 
had been granted his wage payments and further requests for 
judicial relief would not affect the rights of the 
litigants. 
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established criteria for determining which cases warrant 
judicial scrutiny despite their apparent mootness: 
The principles that determine the justiciability 
of the instant case are the well-established rules 
which permit a court to litigate an issue which, 
although technically moot . . . is of wide 
concern, affects the public interest, is likely to 
recur in a similar manner, and . . . would 
otherwise likely escape judicial review. 
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981) (citations 
omitted); See also Kelp v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah 
1987) ; Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce 
Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911) (establishing the rule 
that "moot" situations "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review" may still be litigated). The case before this Court 
presents valid and important issues of constitutional 
interpretation and the appropriateness of official conduct 
which deserve judicial attention. 
b. Exceptions to the mootness doctrine include important 
issues of wide concern/ apt to be repeated and which affect 
the public interest. 
Where constitutional issues are in dispute, the public 
interest is served by settling the legality of questionable 
practice. Wickham, 629 P.2d at 899. While the discretion 
to address a moot issue rests with the court, the decision 
to hear a moot case is most often made in "class actions, 
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questions of constitutional interpretation, issues as to the 
validity or construction of a statute, or the propriety of 
administrative rulings." Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 
1044 (Utah 1990) (quoting McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 
1191 (Utah 1974))* Additionally, exceptions to the mootness 
doctrine are justified when "there seldom will be sufficient 
time for an appellate court to intervene before" the 
challenged conduct is concluded. Society of Professional 
Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah 1987). 
Other state and federal courts have applied this 
analysis to enable adjudication of constitutional issues of 
particular public import. For example, in Mowrer v. Rusk, 
618 P.2d 886 (N.M. 1980), the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled 
that although subsequent legislation resolved the issues 
presented in the case before the bench, the important 
constitutional concern of separation of powers warranted 
judicial determination. Thus, two municipal court judges 
were permitted to bring a declaratory judgment action 
against several Albuquerque City officials. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court maintained that because the case provided an 
opportunity for a ruling on the conduct of public officials, 
it should not be dismissed because of mootness: "Among the 
criteria considered in determining the existence of the 
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requisite degree of public interest are the public or 
private nature of the question presented, the desirability 
of an authoritative determination for future guidance of 
public officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of 
the question-" Mowrer, supra, 618 P.2d at 889, (citing 
People v- Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 772 (111. 1952), cert, 
denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952)). The Court also held that the 
constitutional issues raised by Mowrer were worthy of 
judicial review because "[t]he parameters of the separation 
of powers doctrine presents a recurring problem of great 
public interest." Mowrer, 618 P.2d at 890. 
Similarly, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that although the school district indicated that prayers in 
band class had ceased, the case presented an actual 
controversy. Steele v. Van Buren Public School District, 
845 F.2d 1492 (8th Cir. 1988). "Voluntary cessation of 
allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of 
power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make 
the case moot." Id. at 1494 (quoting United States v. W.T. 
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953) (where "the heavy 
burden of demonstrating that Athere is no reasonable 
expectation that the wrong will be repeated7 was placed on 
the defendant.") Because the Van Buren school district 
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failed to show "that it does not and will not permit prayer 
at school functions," Steele was not moot. Steelef 845 P.2d 
at 1494-95. The challenge to the school district action 
remained valid because the defendant was free to resume the 
disputed conduct and had not met its heavy burden of 
"showing that *there is no reasonable expectation' that it 
will permit teachers to conduct prayer in school. . . . " 
Id. at 1494-95. 
c. Because this case presents a critical question of 
constitutional interpretation and governmental conduct which 
impact the public concern, it deserves the attention of this 
Court. 
As the foregoing cases establish, the current matter 
presents constitutional issues which demand clarification by 
this Court. The actions of the Superintendent — his 
allocation of public funds to encourage and support prayer 
at graduation ceremonies — raise questions of wide concern 
to the public. Wickham, supra, 629 P.2d at 899. In 
particular, the detailed language of the Utah establishment 
clause imposes a heightened duty on state actors to maintain 
rigid separation of church and state. Utah Const. Article 
I, § 4. Few things warrant the attention of this Court or 
threaten the public interest more than state officials who 
violate a highly prized provision of the state constitution. 
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McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d at 1191; Reynolds, supra. In 
addition, the speed with which public officials can disburse 
public funds under their discretion will rarely permit 
adequate opportunity for judicial intervention before an 
appropriation has been made and the funds spent. Bullock, 
743 P.2d at 1169. Resolution of this case will provide 
Utah's public officials with important judicial guidance so 
that they can conform their future conduct to the dictates 
of the Utah Constitution. As in Mowrer, a ruling on the 
constitutionality of the Superintendent's conduct will guide 
future actions of all public officials entrusted with 
discretion over the public coffers. 
Most importantly, the actions implicated in this case 
are likely to re-occur. Absent direction from this Court 
and while interpretation of the Utah establishment clause 
remains disputed, public school officials and other state 
actors may well spend more public money to support future 
legal battles which endorse religious exercise. While the 
issue of public prayer at graduation ceremonies may be 
temporarily resolved, the recent decision in the United 
States Supreme Court was 5 to 4. Lee v. Weisman, supra, No. 
90-1014. A change in United States Supreme Court make up or 
a slight alteration in the reasoning endorsed by members of 
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the majority may rekindle enthusiasm for litigation aimed 
again at permitting prayer at public school functions. In 
addition, the United States Supreme Court specifically did 
not decide the issue of prayers at ceremonies at state 
colleges or universities. Id. at 14 (opinion). Perhaps the 
next case in which Utah officials will become involved will 
seek judicial approval of public prayers at university 
graduations or football games. The range of possible 
violations of Article I, § 4 by Utah officials is not 
limited to the context of religious exercise in public high 
schools. As the Lee v. Weisman Court insisted, lf[t]his case 
does not require us to revisit the difficult questions 
dividing us in recent cases, questions of the definition and 
full scope of the principles governing the extent of 
permitted accommodation by the State for the religious 
beliefs and practices of many of its citizens.11 Id. at 7. 
Without guidance from this Court, Utah officials could and 
may engage in all manner of legal campaigns to place the 
state7s imprimatur upon religious activity. Society of 
Separationists, et al vs. Whitehead, et al. Case No. 91-
090613 6, (Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
April 9, 1992) pending before this Court on appeal, Case No. 
92-0233. 
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Indeed, the principle of Steele that unilateral 
cessation of challenged behavior does not lessen the need 
for judicial intervention further supports the Society's 
request for declaratory relief herein. The Superintendent 
insists that he did not violate the state constitution by 
spending public funds in support of a pro-prayer legal 
stance. Superintendent's Memorandum in Support of his 
Motion to Dismiss at 10-11. Although the Superintendent 
recanted on his public pledge to further involve Utah public 
funds in the Rhode Island case, his promise to do so also 
indicates that he found nothing unsettling about his past 
behavior and that he apparently would not hesitate to engage 
in similar behavior in the future. Clearly, under W.T. 
Grant, the Superintendent has not met the burden of 
demonstrating that state officials will not repeat the 
contested conduct. Appellee or his successors remain free 
to (and apparently prone to) engage in similar behavior 
unless there is a mandate from this Court.5 
5
 Guidance to governmental officials is especially 
necessary and important to the constitutional issues raised 
by this case; several state officers saw fit to spend public 
funds to support the Providence school district in its pro-
prayer appeal. As indicated above, supra at 8, the Attorney 
General of Utah filed an amicus brief in support of 
Providence's petition for certiorari and the Alpine School 
District filed an amicus brief on the merits in Lee v. 
Weisman, vigorously advocating prayer at public school 
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Clear precedent and solid legal theory establish the 
Society's request for declaratory relief worthy of judicial 
attention. The Superintendent's conduct is capable of 
repetition, but evasive of review. Given the continued 
attempts of the United State Supreme Court to delineate the 
wall that separates church and state, there will be many 
opportunities for Utah government officials to contribute 
public funds to litigants supporting government religious 
exercise in future legal battles. The speed with which 
public appropriations can be made frustrates prevention of 
unlawful expenditures before they occur. In light of the 
Superintendent's failure to even suggest that similar 
appropriations will not be made in the future, the Society 
is entitled to a ruling on the constitutionality of the 
challenged expenditure. Indeed, courts are particularly 
compelled to make judgments when constitutional questions 
and the lawfulness of conduct of public officials is at 
issue. Most importantly, a ruling on the merits of this 
case will properly serve the important public interest of 
delineating the separation of church and state demanded by 
Utah's establishment clause. 
functions. 
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II. The Society is Entitled to Declaratory Judgment 
Establishing as Unconstitutional the Superintendent's 
Contribution of Public Funds to the Pro-Prayer Appeal. 
While this Court has had little opportunity to construe 
the establishment clause of the Utah Constitution, the 
provision invites only rigid interpretation. Article I, § 4 
of the Utah Constitution reads quite differently than the 
federal establishment clause.6 In part, the Utah provision 
directs: 
. There shall be no union of Church and 
State, nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. No public money or 
property shall be appropriated for or applied to 
any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or 
for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. . . . 
Unlike its federal counterpart, the Utah Constitution 
provides a strict and specific guarantee of separation of 
church and state. See Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, 689 
(Utah 1982) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting, four 
separate opinions, utilizing constitutional construction 
which looked to the precise wording of the provision for the 
framers' intent). Appropriately, the unique language of the 
6
 The establishment clause of the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution reads simply: "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion 
ii 
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establishment clause of the state constitution has not gone 
unnoticed by this Court: 
. [P]rovision of Section 4, Article I, of 
the Utah Constitution . * . is more articulate and 
express in assuring religious liberty and 
prohibiting discrimination, or church interference 
with private or public rights, than the generality 
of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549, 552-553 (Utah 1973) 
(Crockett, J., concurring). While this Court has not 
articulated any detailed analysis or constitutional standard 
premised upon the guarantees of this provision, the cases 
that interpret Article I, § 4 indicate that any direct or 
non-incidental aid to religious exercise is prohibited by 
the provision.7 
7
 While this Court has not had the opportunity to deal 
at length with the terms of Article 1, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution, the Court has developed a body of state law 
based on other unique provisions of the state constitution. 
For example, in KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 
1983), the Court undertook the interpretation of Article 1, 
§ 15 of the Utah Constitution even though the issue before 
then could have been concluded under federal law. (Article 
1, § 15 provides, similar to the language of the First 
Amendment: "No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain 
the freedom of speech or of the press.") Conceding that the 
provision had never been authoritatively interpreted, the 
Court took on the task, beginning with a survey of 
discussion concerning the provision at the Constitutional 
Convention. id. at 518-519. Because the intent of the 
authors' was not forthcoming from delegative history, the 
Court turned for guidance to the judicial decisions — 
especially those prior to the 1895 Convention — in states 
with constitution provisions similar to those of Utah. id. 
After lengthy analysis of these cases, the Court concluded 
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A. Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution Prohibits Direct 
Aid to Religious Exercise. 
Twice in 1948, this Court dealt with challenges to 
government action under the state's no-aid provision. In 
Gubler v. Utah State Teachers7 Retirement, 113 Utah 118, 192 
P. 2d 580 (1948), the Court upheld a retirement plan which 
allowed teachers to receive retirement credit for years 
spent teaching in private schools. Because this program 
served to entice experienced teachers away from private 
schools and gave them retirement credit only after they had 
joined the public school system, the Court held that the 
scheme did not involve the appropriation of public funds for 
religious instruction. Id. at 192, P.2d at 587. On similar 
grounds, this Court also refused to enjoin the use of state 
funds for the construction of a memorial building by the 
Daughters of Utah Pioneers. Thomas v. Daughters of Utah 
Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477 (1948). The Court held 
that without "positive evidence of the efforts on the part 
of [the] society to favor any particular religion," it would 
assume that the ultimate nature of the project would be 
that although freedom of the press was not intended to be 
absolute or superior to other constitutional guarantees, the 
delegates and voters who framed and adopted Article 1, § 15 
intended the provision to be "at least as protective of 
[freedom of the press] as the First Amendment." Id. at 521. 
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secular. Id. at 197 P.2d at 489 (emphasis original). 
Therefore, funds appropriated to aid the memorial building 
did not violate the ban on public aid for religious 
purposes. More recently, this Court sustained a plan to 
sell municipal bonds to finance the construction of a 
hospital by a church run corporation and to lease state land 
for the project. Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549 
(1973). However, the scheme was found to be constitutional 
because terms of the lease explicitly prevented religious 
activities in the hospital.8 
In each of these cases, this Court found that no 
religious practice or institution stood to benefit from the 
challenged government action and saw no reason to 
investigate further the implications of Article I, § 4. 
The challenged schemes did little or nothing to advance 
religion institutions involved. Importantly, the primary 
purpose of each scheme was secular and outweighed any 
insubstantial gains realized by the religious or quasi-
religious organizations. 
8
 The lease provided "that there will be no chapels or 
other religious rooms set aside at the hospital and there 
will be no religious symbols . . . [and] no proselyting by 
any religious sect or distribution of literature, books 
brochures, symbols, or other activities relating to or being 
of a proselyting nature shall be in said hospital." Manning 
517 P.2d at 551. 
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Although final parameters of Utah establishment law are 
not clear, a strict interpretation foundation for the 
provision is in place• This basis can be further augmented 
by analysis of strict separation rulings in states with no-
aid declarations similar to Utah's provision. 
B. In States With Constitutional Provisions Similar to 
Utah's, Courts Have Rigidly Interpreted No-Aid Provisions. 
History indicates that Utah adopted its establishment 
provision from the Washington State Constitution and indeed, 
the similarities between the two provisions suggest this. 
Hickman, Utah Constitutional Law, Doctoral Thesis, 
University of Utah (1955). Article I, § 11 of the 
Washington Constitution9 mandates that fl[n]o public money or 
property shall be appropriated for, or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support 
of any religious establishment." In equally strong 
language, Article IX, § 4 of the Washington Constitution 
guarantees that public schools will be free of sectarian 
9
 Wash. Const. Art. I, § 11 has been amended twice, in 
1904 to allow for employment of chaplains at state prisons, 
and in 1957 to allow for chaplains at custodial and mental 
institutions. 
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control or influence.10 On the basis of these two passages, 
the Washington Supreme Court has maintained a strict 
approach to separation of church and state in public 
schools. The Washington Court has repeatedly found the 
absolute language of its state charter to demand analysis 
more rigid conduct than federal precedent. 
Weiss v. Bruno, 509 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1973), challenged a 
state tuition scheme to benefit disadvantaged students 
attending private schools and private institutions of higher 
learning. To invalidate this program, the Washington Court 
found the proscription of Article IX, § 4 determinative. 
Contending that the provision was "far stricter than the 
more generalized prohibition of the first amendment," the 
Court announced that: 
There is no such thing as a ^de minimis' violation 
of article IX, § 4. Nor is a violation of this 
provision determined by means of a balancing 
10
 Wash. Const. Art. IX, § 4 reads: "All schools 
maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public 
funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or 
influence." Although Utah has a similar provision, the 
prohibition of sectarian influence in public schools is not 
directly relevant to the issue of prayer. However, most 
state establishment case law involves aid to parochial 
schools and therefore refers to mandates concerning public 
schools as well as the prohibitions of the establishment 
clause. While the decisions in these cases rely upon the 
language in both the general and public school provisions, 
the holdings often deal separately with the more broad text 
of the establishment clause. 
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process. The words of article IX, § 4 mean 
precisely what they say; the prohibition is 
absolute.11 
Far from unusual, the Weiss decision followed a line of 
precedent containing a literal reading of the absolute terms 
of the state Constitution. Previously, the Washington Court 
had twice held that publicly funded transportation of 
parochial school students violated both Article I, § 11 and 
Article IX, § 4.12 Further, the Court specifically rejected 
the argument that it should permit public transportation of 
private school children because such a program had been 
sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court. Consistent 
with its rejection of direct or indirect aid to religious 
schools, the Court also struck down state-sponsored loan 
programs for church college students. State Higher 
Education Assistance Authority v. Graham, 529 P.2d 1051 
(Wash. 1974). 
Witters v. State Commission of the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 
(Wash. 1989), represents the Washington Court's most recent 
11
 Id. at 978. A footnote to this passage suggests that 
the only possible qualification to the "sweeping 
prohibition" of this state constitutional provision would be 
the free exercise clause of the United States Constitution. 
12
 Mitchell v. Consolidated School District No. 201, 135 
P.2d 79 (Wash. 1943), and Visser v. Nooksack Valley School 
District No. 506, 207 P.2d 198 (Wash. 1949). 
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refusal to back down from its rigid interpretation of the 
state's constitutional guarantees. After the United States 
Supreme Court found valid state assistance to a visually 
handicapped student seeking a theological education under 
the First Amendment, the Washington Court accepted the high 
court's offer "to consider the applicability of the xfar 
stricter' dictates of the Washington State Constitution." 
Id. at 489. Under the mandate of Article I, § 11, no 
appropriations could be made for the applicant's education 
without violating the prohibition against public funds for 
religious instruction. Id. at 1119-1120. Finally, the 
state Court rejected arguments that the denial of aid 
threatened the applicant's free exercise rights or 
implicated equal protection. Id. at 1122-1124.13 
In Sands v. Morongo Unified School District, 809 P.2d 
809 (Cal. 1991), the California Supreme Court found that the 
practice of including prayers at high school graduation 
13
 The Washington Court found that the applicant had 
failed to show fl>the coercive effect of the enactment as it 
operates against him in the practice of his religion.'" 
(quoting District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)). 
Admitting that the applicant may find it difficult or 
impossible to seek a theological education without state 
aid, the Court insisted that free exercise does not entail 
that the government financially facilitate the pursuit of 
religious exercise. Id. at 1123. 
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ceremonies violated the state constitution.14 Because 
Article XVI, § 5 of the California charter "prohibits not 
only material aid to religion but any official involvement 
that promotes religion," government endorsement of 
graduation prayers was deemed unconstitutional. Sands, 809 
P.2d at 820 (emphasis original). Additionally, the "no 
preference" clause of Article I, § 4 — more protective of 
separation than the analogous federal provision — was 
readily violated when the government appeared to take 
"positions on religious questions" by including prayer at 
graduations. Id. 
Rejecting the incidental benefit theory used by the 
court below, the California Supreme Court in another case 
concluded that a textbook loan program to students of 
private schools was unconstitutional. California Teachers 
Association v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981). The Riles 
14
 Article I, § 4 of the California Constitution 
guarantees the "[f]ree exercise and enjoyment of religion 
without discrimination or preference, . . . " while Article 
XVI, § 5 provides: "Neither the Legislature, nor any 
county, city and county, township, school district, or other 
municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or 
pay from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or 
in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian 
purpose whatever. . . . " and Article IX, § 8 states: "No 
public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of 
any sectarian or denominational school, and any school not 
under the exclusive control of the officers of the public 
schools." 
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Court adopted a two-part test to determine if government aid 
violated the California Constitution, asking first if the 
benefit derived from the loan program was direct or indirect 
and second, if the aid was substantial or incidental. Id, 
at 962 (confirmed in Sands, 809 P.2d 809 (Mosk, J. 
concurring)). Applying the first prong of this test, the 
Court concluded that because providing textbooks to children 
supports both the students and the school, the program 
impermissible benefits the sectarian school. Id. at 962-
963. Under the second prong, the Court found that text 
books, unlike fire protection, advanced the central 
objective of the sectarian schools — education of children. 
Id. at 963. The Court avidly rejected the assumption that 
secular texts would be used for secular instruction only. 
Id. at 963-964. 
Oregon has similarly declared graduation prayers 
unconstitutional on the basis of a no-aid provision15 of the 
state constitution. Kay v. David Douglas School District 
No. 40, 719 P.2d 875 (Or.App. 1986), rev'd and dismissed for 
15
 Article I, § 5 of the Oregon Constitution states: 
"No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the 
benefit of any religeous [sic] or theological 
institution, nor shall any money be appropriated for 
the payment of any religeous [sic] services in either 
house of the Legislative Assembly.11 
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lack of justiciability, 738 P.2d 1389 (Or. 1987). In Kay 
the Oregon Court interpreted the prohibition of Article I, § 
5 strictly, finding it applicable even though the teacher 
scheduled to lead the prayer volunteered her time: 
The fact that money spent on the preparation and 
delivery of the invocation was not apportioned and 
identified as a "line item" in the budget does not 
take it out of the proscription of section 5, 
which prohibits the spending of any money for the 
benefit of any religious or theological 
institution. 
Id. at 878 (emphasis original). The Oregon court declared 
that the "wall of separation between church and state" was 
breached. Id. When taken as a whole, the court held that 
Article I, § 5 forbids "far more" than just direct payments 
in support of a religious institution. Id. at 878. 
While the above pited cases portray the inclination of 
state courts to interpret state constitutional provisions 
independently of federal law and to uphold the strict 
separation of government and religion mandated in these 
provisions. The diligence with which these courts guard 
against state establishment of religion should influence 
this Court to embrace a rigid interpretation of Article I, § 
4. Interestingly, the reasoning adopted by the California 
Courts to interpret their state constitutional provisions is 
similar to interpretation suggested by Utah case law. While 
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both constitutions may allow incidental benefits to 
religious institutions and practice, aid that directly 
benefits religion or aid with a central purpose to benefit 
religion is prohibited. Unlike the California textbook loan 
program that benefitted children and non-secular schools 
directly, the Utah schemes were not intended to and did 
little to advance the religion. Thomas v. Daughters of Utah 
Pioneers, 197 P.2d 477; Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 
549. Although the California Courts would not permit a 
textbook loan program, they approve governmental fire 
protection and waste removal for religious institutions. 
These benefits are incidental and part of broad programs not 
directed at religious institutions themselves. Similarly, 
the Utah Constitution allowed some indirect benefits to a 
church that built a hospital or a historical society that 
constructed a museum when this Court was assured that each 
edifice was devoid of religious overtones. Any benefits to 
the religious institutions were permissible because they 
were ancillary and incidental. However, like the California 
Constitution, the Utah Constitution does not permit the 
expenditure of public funds which are intended to and 
directly do aid and support religious exercise. 
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C. The Superintendent's Ten Thousand Dollar ($10,000.00) 
Appropriation Constitutes An Unlawful Expenditure of Public 
Funds on Religious Exercise. 
By financing Rhode Island's appeal of the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals' decision to ban public prayer at school 
graduation ceremonies, the Superintendent was directly 
encouraging and aiding a religious exercise — prayer in 
public schools. The only other action that the 
Superintendent could have taken which would have more 
directly aided or encouraged prayer at Rhode Island Schools 
would have been to direct that Utah's $10,000.00 (Ten 
Thousand Dollars) be used to pay an honorarium to the 
preacher recruited to give the invocation. 
The unconstitutionality of this expenditure is readily 
distinguishable from the legitimate need for the 
Superintendent to finance litigation in which he or the 
state public school system is a party. While the 
Superintendent's ten thousand dollar ($10,000.00) gift 
constitutes direct and purposeful aid to and support of 
religious exercise, any funds spent for litigation involving 
prayer to which the state of Utah is a party, would only 
incidentally benefit religious exercise.16 Using the 
16
 Plaintiffs are not challenging the expenditure of 
state funds to defend this action. 
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analysis implied in Utah case law and articulated in 
California establishment law, the impropriety of the former 
expenditure in contrast to the legitimacy of the latter 
appropriation is apparent. 
As legal advisor to the Superintendent, the Utah 
Attorney General can "prosecute or defend all causes to 
which the state . . . is a party; and take charge, as 
attorney, of all civil legal matters in which the state is 
interested. . . ." U.C.A. § 67-5-1 (1953 as amended).17 
There is no provision which allows the Superintendent to 
finance any legal battle he chooses, especially when doing 
so violates the constitution. However, should the 
Superintendent be a party to a law suit that, for example, 
contests the constitutionality of public prayer at Utah 
public schools graduations, public funds can lawfully be 
spent to defend the Superintendent in court. 
To defend the exercise of discretionary power by state 
officials is a secular activity. If such litigation 
involved prayer, any resulting expenditure of public funds 
17
 Interestingly, the role of the Attorney General in 
law suits to which the state is not a party is limited to 
that of serving as an attorney. There is no authority for 
the contention that the Superintendent or the Attorney 
General can choose to finance — rather than participate in 
— any litigation they choose. 
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would only incidentally promote religious exercise. The 
primary purpose of the funds would be to fulfill the state's 
obligation to defend employees in litigation brought on by 
actions taken in their official capacity. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-3 0-3 6 (1953 as amended). The defense of state 
officials is not intended to promote religious exercise, 
thus, if it does so, it does only incidentally. Defense of 
such litigation would not constitute voluntary or purposeful 
support of religious exercise. 
For similar reasons, the Utah Constitution is not 
violated when the state or cities provide fire protection 
and waste removal to religious institutions. The government 
has a broad policy of providing fire protection and waste 
removal that is not aimed at religious institutions in 
particular. When such a program incidentally aids a 
religious institution, the benefits are not the consequence 
of direct aid to non-secular activity. Any such incidental 
benefits to religious institutions are overridden by the 
non-secular purpose of the policy. 
However, such situations which involve only incidental 
benefits to religious exercise are radically different from 
the case at bar, where the Superintendent has voluntarily, 
affirmatively and purposefully aided the litigation, the 
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sole purpose of which is to legalize prayer at public school 
graduation ceremonies. The Superintendent has intentionally 
chosen an issue and he has voluntarily decided to promote 
one side of the issue. He did not involuntarily become 
embroiled in the Rhode Island case and his promotion of 
religious worship is not an incidental result of his 
official duties. Instead, his support of the Rhode Island 
case constitutes a deliberate choice to finance the pro-
prayer stance advocated by the Providence school district. 
The Superintendent can offer no legitimate secular 
reason for the gift to the Providence school district and no 
potential secular effect which could result from the 
Superintendent's pro-prayer appropriation. Rather than 
reflecting a neutral stance, the Superintendent's choice to 
fund only one side of the Rhode Island prayer case, advanced 
solely the cause of prayer in public schools. Certainly, 
if, as he now claims, the Superintendent had wanted to 
insure that the issues reached the United States Supreme 
Court for "resolution,11 the equitable approach would be to 
equally fund both sides of the dispute. Yet, the 
Superintendent did not contribute to the legal fees of 
Weisman, the prayer opponent in the Rhode Island case, to 
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guarantee that the anti-prayer arguments were adequately 
presented to the high court. Instead, he funded only the 
efforts of those who supported prayer in public schools. 
Additionally, the Superintendent now justifies his 
actions in part claiming he sought the end of litigation in 
Utah's courts concerning prayer at school. In fact, a 
decision by the United States Supreme Court to deny 
certiorari would have achieved this goal. Such a denial 
would have approved the First Circuit's ruling that prayer 
in public high school graduation ceremonies violates the 
establishment clause. The First Circuit Court of Appeals' 
decision in Weisman v. Lee was consistent with the rulings 
of other federal Courts of Appeal that prayer at public 
school events violates the federal establishment clause. 
See Collins vs. Chandler Unified School District, 862 F.2d 
824 (11th Circuit); Edwards vs. Acruillard, 482 U.S. 578 
(1987).18 Because the First Circuit's ruling is consistent 
18
 Opponents of the Lee v. Weisman ruling allege that 
the conflicts existed among recent rulings in the Courts of 
Appeals. The Sixth Circuit, in Stein v. Plainwell Community 
Schools, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987), applied a test from 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (where nonsectarian 
prayers opening state legislative sessions were upheld 
because of the traditional nature of the practice), to 
reject the use of the nonsecular prayers during graduation 
ceremonies. The First Circuit in Weisman v. Leer 728 F. 
Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990) 
rejected the Marsh test as inapplicable to public schools. 
43 
with precedent and with Utah's clear constitutional 
provisions, without further review it could have stood as a 
solid guide to Utah's public school officials. Similarly, 
the case could have served as important precedent in the 
adjudication of any Utah prayer cases still pending under 
federal law. 
Another fancied dilemma which the Superintendent posits 
for his conduct — public school officials trapped between 
individuals suing to compel prayers at schools and those 
wishing to prevent them — is totally unfounded. In 
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) the 
Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that 
failure to allow organized prayer would either violate the 
Instead they adopted the three-prong Establishment Clause 
test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (affording 
particular concern for prayer in the particular context of 
public elementary and secondary schools). Those in favor of 
certiorari review wanted the Supreme Court to rule on the 
appropriateness of applying the Marsh test to public school 
prayer issues. However, three weeks after the Stein 
decision was handed down, the Supreme Court confirmed the 
appropriateness of the Lemon test in school related 
Establishment Clause cases. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 
578 (1987). The Court further specified that because the 
Marsh test was founded upon a historical approach, it was 
"not useful in determining the proper roles of church and 
state in public schools, since free public education was 
virtually non-existent at the time the Constitution was 
adopted.11 Id. at 58 3 n.4. Thus, the Supreme Court had 
already decided which test to apply to the public school 
context. The Superintendent's willingness to ignore the 
holding in Edwards indicates his pro-prayer stance. 
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free exercise clause or would amount to the establishment of 
religious secularism. The right to free exercise of 
religion does not mean that individuals can "use the 
machinery of the state to practice [their] beliefs." 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963). As the United States 
Supreme Court has so aptly put: "The free exercise clause 
simply cannot be understood to require the government to 
conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with 
the religious beliefs of a particular citizen." Bowen v. 
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986). See also, Lundberq v. 
West Monona Community School District. 731 F.Supp 331 (N.D. 
Iowa 1989) (finding that a high school graduation ceremony 
was not a public forum). The Superintendent could not 
honestly claim to seek remedy for this fictitious dispute by 
calling for guidance from the Supreme Court. Alternatively, 
Utah could easily avoid fighting about graduation prayer by 
following a neutral stance with respect to religion, denying 
prayer at public school functions. 
Most importantly, Utah's constitutional establishment 
clause (Art. I, § 4) is the final determinative factor as to 
the propriety of prayer in Utah public schools. See Sands 
v. Morongo Unified School District, 809 P. 2d 809, 836 (Cal. 
1991) (Mosk, J., concurring) (maintaining in the context of 
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graduation prayer the "[s]tate courts are, and should be, 
the first line of defense for individual liberties"). 
Although holdings of various federal courts present a 
unified minimum legal basis to which Utah Courts can look, 
the Utah Constitution requires protection more expansive 
than that provided under federal law. The United States 
Supreme Court in deciding Weisman v. Lee would not and did 
not consider the controlling provisions of Art. I, § 4 of 
the Utah Constitution. Thus, a decision in Weisman v. Lee 
would be and was of little help in determining the 
application of Article I, § 4 to high school graduation 
prayers in Utah. 
Thus, the alleged neutral goals which the 
Superintendent claims to have sought to advance by financing 
the Rhode Island appeal could have been achieved without the 
expenditure of Utah public funds and without taking a stance 
favoring religious exercises in Rhode Island. However, the 
Superintendent chose to unlawfully appropriate funds to 
support religious exercise in public schools. He used 
public funds to aid litigation — outside Utah — which 
sought to legalize school prayer. Representing direct and 
intentional support of religious exercise, this 
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appropriation violated Article I, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The constitutionality of the Superintendent's conduct 
should be determined by this Court. Taxpayers have standing 
to challenge the Superintendent's conduct. As a result of 
the unlawful expenditure, plaintiffs have suffered a real 
and direct injury which would be redressed by the 
declaratory relief requested. In addition, the Society has 
an unsurpassed interest in the issues of this case which 
would likely go unaddressed if plaintiffs were denied 
standing. Finally, the constitutional questions raised 
herein are of great public importance and worthy of judicial 
attention. 
The Society's claim for declaratory judgment presents 
an actual controversy, warranting the attention of the 
judiciary. Important constitutional issues and questions of 
official misconduct, capable of repetition, remain to be 
addressed. Indeed, after judicial interpretation of this 
matter, Utah public officials will be better able to tailor 
their behavior to the mandates of the constitution. 
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Finally, this Court should declare the Superintendents 
unlawful expenditure to fund the legalization of prayer in 
public schools unconstitutional under Article I, § 4. Far 
from incident and ancillary, the Superintendent's actions 
represent direct financial support for religious exercise, 
activity clearly prohibited by Utah's Constitution. While 
the Superintendent has some discretion to use public funds, 
he cannot do so in a manner that violates the Utah 
Constitution. 
Wherefore, the decision of the trial court should be 
reversed. This Court should enter a judgment, granting the 
Society the relief they requested, declaring the 
Superintendent's appropriation unconstitutional under the 
Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
Dated this 15th day of JULY, 1992. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS ALLEN; SOCIETY OF 
SEPARATIONISTS, INC., 





JAY B. TAGGART, Utah State 
Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, 
Defendant. 
C O M P L A I N T 
C i v i l No. 91-090-2848 CV 
(Hon. T° Hanson 
PLAINTIFFS, as a cause of action against the defendant 
Jay Taggart, state and allege as follows: 
1. The Society of Separationists, Inc. is a Maryland 
non-profit corporation registered to do business in Utah. 
One of the corporate goals of the Society and the Utah 
Chapter of the Society is to preserve and maintain the 
separation of church and state as required by the United 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT^ 
States Constitution (First Amendment) and the Utah Constitu-
tion (Art. I, § 4). 
2. The Utah Chapter of the Society of Separationists, 
Inc. is made up of individual members who are residents and 
taxpayers of the State of Utah. 
3. Richard Andrews is a resident and citizen of the 
State of Utah. He is a taxpayer and has for many years paid 
various taxes (income, sales, etc.) to the State of Utah. 
He is a member and the Co-Director of the Utah Chapter of 
the Society of Separationists. 
4. Chris Allen is a resident and citizen of the State 
of Utah. He is a taxpayer and has for many years paid 
various taxes (income, sales, etc.) to the State of Utah. 
He is a member and the Director of the Utah Chapter of the 
Society of Separationists. 
5. Jay B. Taggart, is the duly appointed and serving 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction. He supervises 
and manages state tax funds and state monies and property on 
behalf of the Utah State Office of Education and/or the Utah 
State Board of Education. 
6. Art. I, § 4, of the Utah Constitution provides in 
pertinent part: 
. . . The State shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . There shall be no 
union of Church and State, nor shall any church 
dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious 
worship, exercise or instruction, or for the 
support of any ecclesiastical establishment. 
7. On or about January 23, 1991, the Utah State Office 
of Education by and through the defendant, Jay B. Taggart 
gave to the Providence School Committee (and/or its privies 
to the following described litigation) the sum of ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00) from Utah state funds (public 
money) for the purpose of aiding or encouraging the Provi-
dence School Committee (and/or its privies) to seek and 
pursue a writ of certiorari before the United States Supreme 
Court in the case of Robert E. Lee, et al v. Daniel Weisman, 
etc., Case No. 90-1014. (That case is hereinafter referred 
to as the "Rhode Island School Prayer case.") The issue in 
that case is the constitutionality of a practice of having 
denominational prayers at high school graduation ceremonies 
in Providence, Rhode Island. 
8. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in the Rhode Island School Prayer case describe above. 
9. The defendant and/or his agents have publically 
stated that defendant's office and/or the State of Utah 
and/or a state agency may file an amicus brief in the United 
States Supreme Court in Rhode Island School Prayer case 
addressing the merits of that case. 
10. The preparation and filing of such an amicus brief 
on the merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case by the 
defendant and his staff will result in the further use and 
expenditure of public money and/or property by the defendant 
and his staff. 
11. The preparation and filing of such an amicus brief 
on the merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case by the 
defendant and his staff on behalf of the State of Utah will 
result in the further use and expenditure of public money or 
property by the defendant and his staff in the aid of 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, and/or for the 
support of an ecclesiastical establishment. 
12. The plaintiffs object to the past expenditure of 
public funds, as set forth above, for the purpose of aiding 
any religious worship, exercise or instruction, and/or for 
the support of an ecclesiastical establishment. 
13. Plaintiffs object to any future expenditure or 
gift of public funds (similar to that set forth above) for 
the purpose of aiding any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, and/or for the support of an ecclesiastical 
establishment. 
14. Plaintiffs object to any future expenditure or 
gift of public funds (similar to that set forth above) for 
the purpose of aiding any party in the case of Robert E. 
Lee, et al v. Daniel Weisman, etc, Case No. 90-1014, before 
the United States Supreme Court. 
15. Plaintiffs object to any future expenditure of 
public funds for the purpose of filing any briefs or in any 
other way participating in the case of Robert E. Lee, et al 
v. Daniel Weisman, etc., Case No. 90-1014, before the United 
States Supreme Court. 
16. The plaintiffs believe that unless enjoined and 
restrained by this Court, the defendant will expend public 
funds as set forth above in violation of Art. I, § 4 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
17. The plaintiffs believe that unless enjoined and 
restrained by this Court, the defendant will violate Art. I, 
§ 4 of the Utah Constitution by supporting a ecclesiastical 
establishment through the filing of an amicus brief in the 
Rhode Island School Prayer case. 
18. The anticipated actions of the defendant in 
preparing and filing an amicus brief on the merits in the 
Rhode Island School Prayer case will be in violation of the 
provisions of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
19. Pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq (1953 
as amended) the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory 
judgment to the effect that the gift by the defendant of ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00) to the Providence School 
Committee as set forth above is in violation of the pro-
visions of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
WHEREFORE, this Court should enter a temporary re-
straining order, a preliminary injunction and a permanent 
injunction against the defendant, his agents, staff and 
employees prohibiting them from expending any public funds 
or property in preparing and filing an amicus brief on the 
merits in the Rhode Island School Prayer case. 
This Court should enter a temporary restraining order, 
a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction against 
the defendant, his agents, staff and employees prohibiting 
them from preparing and filing an amicus brief on the merits 
in the Rhode Island School Prayer case. 
Pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq (1953 as 
amended), a declaratory judgment should enter to the effect 
that the gift by the defendant of ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00) to the Providence School Committee as set forth 
above was in violation of the provisions of Art. I, § 4 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
Plaintiffs should be awarded their costs incurred 
herein and such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and proper in the premises. 
DATED LAW DAY this 1st day of MAY, 1991. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
( inty of Salt Lake - State of ah 
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HON. TTMP.THV R. HANSON 
DATE: 7-/7- 9/ 
JUDGE 
Before the Court is the defendant's Motion to Dismiss brought to the 
Court's attention by way of a Request for Decision submitted by the 
defendant's counsel. The Court notes that the Motion to Dismiss was filed 
with supporting Memoranda, and the time for responding by the plaintiffs 
has expired. There being nothing submitted by the plaintiffs, and it 
appearing from reading the materials submitted by the defendant that the 
Motion to Dismiss is well taken, it is granted for the reasons suggested 
bv the defendant. Counsel for the defendant is requested to prepare an 
appropriate Order in conformity with this Minute Entry decision, and 
submit the same to the Court for review and signature pursuant to the Code 
of Judicial Administration. 
Based upon this Court's order dismissing this action, the plaintiffs' 
recently filed Motion for Consolidation is moot, and no further action on 
the part of the defendant will be necessary in relation to that Motion in 
this case. 
/97 
TIM0THY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
Copies t o : 
Brian M. Barnard, Esq. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
JOHN S. MCALLISTER #2140 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South Statef Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-3220 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC. 
a Maryland non-profit 




JAY B. TAGGART, Utah State 
Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, 
Defendant, 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 910902848CV 
Judge: Timothy R. Hanson 
The court, having considered argument pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated June 19, 1991, under Rule 
4-501 C.J.A., and being fully advised in the premises, and having 
made its Minute Entry dated July 17, 1991, which entry is on file 
herein, 
NOW ORDERS, that this matter be and hereby is dismissed 
with prejudice. 
Dated this (
 v; •^ ~day of-July, 1991. 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the // day of July, 1991, a 
copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
JOHN PACE 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
JOHN PACE USB # 5624 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, 
INC. a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; 
and, RICHARD ANDREWS, j 
Plaintiffs, j 
vs. : 
JAY B. TAGGART, Utah State j 
Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, : 
Defendant, : 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
: Civil No. 910902848 CV 
(Hon. Timothy Hanson) 
The plaintiffs, by and through counsel, hereby appeal 
that certain Order and Dismissal signed in the above 
captioned matter on August 6, 1991. This appeal is to the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED t h i s //\T&*y o f AUGUST, 1 9 9 1 . 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to: 
JOHN S. MCALLISTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on the /^ff:day of AUGUST, 1991, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
